Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue Ethics and Tort Law by Feldman, Heidi Li
Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 74
Issue 4 Symposium on Law, Psychology, and the
Emotions
Article 3
October 1999
Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue
Ethics and Tort Law
Heidi Li Feldman
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please
contact dginsberg@kentlaw.iit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Heidi L. Feldman, Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue Ethics and Tort Law, 74 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1431 (2000).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol74/iss4/3
PRUDENCE, BENEVOLENCE, AND NEGLIGENCE: VIRTUE
ETHICS AND TORT LAW
HEIDI LI FELDMAN*
INTRODUCTION
Tort law assesses negligence according to the conduct of a
reasonable person of ordinary prudence who acts with due care for
the safety of others.' This standard assigns three traits to the person
whose conduct sets the bar for measuring negligence: reasonableness,
ordinary prudence, and due care for the safety of others. Yet
contemporary tort scholars have almost exclusively examined only
one of these attributes, reasonableness, and have wholly neglected to
carefully examine the other elements key to the negligence standard:
prudence and due care for the safety of others. It is mistaken to
reduce negligence to reasonableness or to try to understand the sense
of reasonableness contemplated by the negligence standard without
reference to the virtues of prudence and benevolence. Taken
together and analyzed in relation to one another, these three traits
define a distinct evaluative perspective, according to which some
actions expose oneself and others to inappropriate risk of physical
harm, and others do not. In this Article, I only partially articulate this
evaluative perspective, focusing on its dimensions defined by
prudence and care and leaving to one side the dimension defined by
reasonableness. I have restricted the exposition partly because of the
limits of the article format,2 and partly to counterbalance the
overattention to reasonableness that has characterized tort
scholarship of the last fifty years.
The dominant tort theories of the previous half century have
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Ph.D., Philosophy
University of Michigan, 1993; J.D., University of Michigan, 1990; A.B., Brown University, 1986.
The author thanks Jeffrey Bub, David Luban, Naomi Mezey, and Robin West for comments on
drafts of this Article and thanks Matt Warren for dedicated research assistance in preparing the
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1. See 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 7 (1989).
2. I postpone the complete articulation of the evaluative perspective designated by the
negligence standard to HEIDI LI FELDMAN, CARE, CHARACrER, AND AMERICAN TORT LAW
(forthcoming 2001), a book-length work-in-progress.
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attempted to explain and shape the normative bite of the negligence
standard by incorporating into it intensely moralized conceptions of
reasonableness, usually borrowed from Kantianism or utilitarianism
and its public policy counterpart, neoclassical welfare economics.3
Certainly, a comprehensive interpretation of the reasonable person
standard needs a satisfactory account of the reasonableness element
of that standard.4 But by itself no account of reasonableness can
capture completely negligence law's approach to appraising conduct.
The full negligence standard-set by the conduct of a person who is
not only reasonable but also duly prudent and careful-advances a
more fulsome conception of moral personhood, one that sets as the
legal standard a figure who is not only reasonable but also prudential
and careful.
This Article diagnoses contemporary tort scholars' inattention to
the full figure that animates negligence law. I explore the moral and
economic traditions -Kantianism, utilitarianism, and social welfare
economics-that have informed tort scholarship of the past fifty
years. These philosophical and economic traditions themselves
neglect virtues such as prudence and care, and legal scholarship
rooted in them not surprisingly ends up also ignoring these virtues
and their centrality to the negligence standard. I introduce an
alternative philosophical tradition, virtue ethics, to gain purchase on
the role of prudence and care in evaluating conduct. One novel
feature of the virtue ethics approach is that, while it relies on
character traits as a way of appraising conduct, it does not appraise
actions according to the actual subjective motives or character traits
of the actor. In other words, virtue ethics does not think acts inherit
their moral worth from the motive of the actor. Instead, virtue ethics
identifies particular traits as more or less worthy, asks what sort of
acts these traits dispose a person to perform, and then rates acts
according to whether or not they are of the kind a person possessed
of worthy character traits would perform. This approach to moral
3. As I explain further in Section III, I attribute this lapse to tort scholars' preoccupation
with justice and efficiency, and correlatively with moral and economic theories related to these
subjects.
4. In my view, tort law both does and should involve a naturalistic understanding of
reasonableness. On this view, reasonableness is a cognitive trait of human beings, an evolved
adaptation we employ to reason about risks and benefits. To fully understand reasonableness as
it figures in tort law, then, we need to take into account both evolutionary and social
psychological research into how human beings approach risk and gain. See Heidi Li Feldman,
Science, Reason, and Tort Law: Looking for the Reasonable Person, in LAW AND SCIENCE 35
(Helen Reece ed., 1998); Heidi Li Feldman, Negligence Law and Human Psychology (June 29,
1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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epistemology-to the identification of virtuous acts-parallels the
inquiry tort law asks juries to make when evaluating whether a
defendant's actions were or were not negligent. As I argue below, a
standard of conduct based on virtues achieves prescriptivity-the
capacity to license or condemn particular acts-via the performance
of thought experiments, in which the experimenter "predicts" the
behavior of the idealized virtuous person and then sees whether the
conduct under judgment coincides or differs from the act forecasted
by the thought experiment. In a civil tort action, the factfinder-
usually a jury-performs this sort of thought experiment to ascertain
how a person possessed of two specific virtues, prudence and due
carefulness, would behave in a specific situation. Through this
experiment, the jury discovers whether negligence law permits or
proscribes the conduct of the alleged tortfeasor.
Viewing the reasonable person standard as a thought-experiment
apparatus, which people can use to arrive at conclusions about which
acts are inspired or rejected by the virtues of reasonableness,
prudence, and due care together, will disquiet those who seek a more
reductionist definition of negligence. In general, virtue ethics
opposes reductionist interpretations of moral and ethical concepts,
denying that we can decide upon good or worthy conduct by applying
formulas or algorithms. Much recent tort scholarship has attempted
to reduce the meaning of negligence to economic inefficiency or
utility-minimization. While this may make calculating negligence
easier for those entities supposedly set up to achieve economic
efficiency or utility-maximization -that is, the modern corporation-
it displaces the sort of context-sensitive, deliberative evaluation of
actions traditionally invited by the reasonable person standard.
Contrary to the plain language of jury instructions and case law,
economic accounts of the reasonable person standard remake the
person who animates American negligence law in the image of homo
economicus, perhaps to make it easier for corporate persons to align
themselves with the image of personhood put forth by tort law.
Aside from the hermeneutic problems with this makeover-the
fact that it simply ignores the language of the negligence standard-it
raises other, perhaps deeper, concerns. Using the jury to calibrate the
meaning of negligence through context-sensitive, case-specific
thought experiments allows the citizenry to continuously revisit a
fundamental political question: the proper balance between safety
and freedom. In a community whose members want to pursue their
life plans, each member needs to be safe from risk of personal injury
20001
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and have the scope to take action. The results of the thought
experiments juries perform in civil negligence actions are guideposts
to the balance the citizenry endorses. In a political system that
assigns sovereignty to the citizenry, it is the citizens who should
decide how carefully each must act in an effort to avoid personal
injury to others. We cannot hold a referendum each time somebody
is about to act and incidentally risk injuring others. We need,
therefore, another way of forming and expressing collective
judgments about how carefully people should proceed in particular
circumstances. Civil negligence actions, in which juries apply a virtue-
based standard of care, perform this function.
Viewing negligence through the lens of virtue ethics brings the
elements of ordinary prudence and due care into the foreground of
our understanding of the negligence standard of care. This in itself
sets the virtue-based interpretation apart from tort theory of the past
fifty years. But the implications of the virtue-based interpretation
extend beyond assigning significance to the elements of ordinary
prudence and due care. Because a virtue-based approach conceives
of the application of the negligence standard as a thought experiment
best performed by lay people, the virtue-based approach is radically
democratic and populist, in contrast to most major tort theories
advanced from the 1960s through the 1990s.
These theories generally treat the tort system as a vehicle for
social engineering. The different theories assign different outputs as
the objective, ranging from economically efficient conduct to the
realization or protection of Rawlsian equality or Kantian equality, or
the implementation of the formal requirements of corrective justice.
If these outputs were in fact the dominant point of the tort system, lay
jurors and even civil tort actions would be largely superfluous. Lay
jurors possess no particular expertise in economic analysis, liberal
political and moral philosophy, or the structure of corrective justice.
Civil negligence actions do not ask jurors to apply a standard of care
that even refers to these matters. To construe the common law of
negligence developed via judicial doctrine and jury verdicts as a
mechanism of social engineering geared toward any of the goals I
listed above is tantamount to rating the common law of negligence a
failure. Neither the negligence standard nor the process for
developing and applying that standard would be sensible components
of an engine meant to churn out economic efficiency, Rawlsian
equality, or Kantian autonomy.
One somewhat plausible response to this observation would be
[Vol. 74:1431
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to scrap the negligence standard or the common law approach to
accidental injury, or both, in favor of a legal or political institution
designed specifically to achieve one's preferred output. Even if such
measures could be instituted-a doubtful prospect-they are not a
good idea. Eliminating the negligence standard and the jury's role in
applying it would sacrifice something of political and social
importance: the opportunity for popular, collective judgments about
how each citizen should conduct herself or himself when the pursuit
of her or his own objectives creates the risk of injuring somebody
else. Jury verdicts in negligence actions give social content to the
virtues of prudence and due care, repeatedly providing concrete
conclusions about the sort of conduct that is consistent or inconsistent
with these dispositions. In this Article, I argue that ordinary people
are cognitively well-equipped to reach these conclusions through
collaboratively comparing a specific defendant's conduct to that of a
fictional person endowed with the virtues of prudence and due care
who is faced with the circumstances confronted by the actual tort
defendant. Jury verdicts reached by such a process preserve popular
sovereignty over the appropriate balance between safety and
freedom, a fundamental and persistent political question in a society
in which people's liberty to act consistently exposes themselves and
others to risk of physical injury.
I. VIRTUE ETHICS IN THE LANDSCAPE OF MORAL THEORY
For most of the twentieth century-the century of modem tort
theory-the majority of moral and political philosophers have been
either Kantians or utilitarians. Kantian moral theory focuses
primarily on questions of individual autonomy and equality; Kantian
political theory focuses on distributive justice, working from the
premise that the allocation of resources fundamentally influences
autonomy and equality. Utilitarianism focuses on maximizing
pleasure and minimizing pain. Utilitarian moral and political
philosophy begot microeconomic social welfare theory, the dominant
theoretical approach to political economy in the United States for at
least the second half of the twentieth century. In the realm of public
policy, neoclassical economists have defined the central issue as
efficiently maximizing overall social welfare, a project cast in terms of
satisfying as many preferences as possible rather than as a problem of
2000]
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increasing pleasure or decreasing pain.'
In contrast to these moral and economic traditions, virtue ethics
does not concern itself with individual autonomy, social equality, or
the monolithic centrality of pleasure or desires in human life. Nor
does it fundamentally address distributive justice or the objective of
satisfying as many people's preferences as possible (the maximization
of social welfare). What unites philosophers in the virtue ethics
tradition - a tradition that ranges from ancient Greece to contem-
porary western societies6-is their concern with the quality of human
life and an effort to identify both what counts as a life of high quality
or worth and the character traits it takes to achieve one.7
The virtue ethics enterprise differs in kind from Kantianism,
utilitarianism, and welfare economics. Kantianism asks, Which acts
accord with moral law, a law that preserves the autonomy of the
agents who answer to it? Autonomy and freedom are of central
moral importance, and other human concerns fall outside the domain
of ethics. Utilitarianism asks, Which acts promote pleasure and
diminish pain? These experiential states are all that are relevant to
moral life. Welfare economists ask, Which measures maximize the
satisfaction of preferences? Subjective desires are the only variable
5. See Robin West, The Other Utilitarians, in ANALYZING LAW: NEW ESSAYS IN LEGAL
THEORY 197,206 (Brian Bix ed., 1998).
6. The most prominent classical virtue ethicist was Aristotle. During medieval times, St.
Thomas Aquinas developed a Christian virtue ethics. In the eighteenth century, Scottish
philosophers such as Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and Adam Smith connected virtue ethics
to emotion and its role in moral judgment. In the mid-twentieth century, English philosophers
such as Philippa Foot and Iris Murdoch championed a secular virtue ethics as a rival to
Kantianism. Late twentieth century virtue ethicists such as Martha Nussbaum and Rosalind
Hursthouse develop virtue ethics against a background reality of liberal political systems that
diverge greatly from the political setting assumed by Aristotle. Contemporary virtue ethicists
such as John McDowell, David Wiggins, and Simon Blackburn fall into the category because of
their emphasis on how character and specific sentimental responses to the world figure in moral
judgment.
7. Aristotle argues for the identity of human flourishing, happiness, and "the soul's
activity that expresses virtue." ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 17 (lines 1098a10-15)
(Terence Irwin trans., 1985). He maintains that the end of human life is a "sort of living well
and doing well in action" and that "the happy person lives well and does well," thus confirming
the identity between the end for humans, happiness, and action in accord with virtue. Id. at 19
(line 1098b25); see also PHILIPPA FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL
PHILOSOPHY 3 (1978) ("[V]irtues are in general beneficial characteristics, and indeed ones that
a human being needs to have, for his own sake and that of his fellows."); IRIS MURDOCH, THE
SOVEREIGNTY OF GOOD 78 (1971) ("Ethics should not be merely an analysis of ordinary
mediocre conduct, it should be a hypothesis about good conduct and about how this can be
achieved. How can we make ourselves better? is a question moral philosophers should attempt
to answer."); ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 212 (D. D. Raphael & A. L.
Macfie eds., 1976) ("When we consider the character of any individual, we naturally view it
under two different aspects; first, as it may affect his own happiness; and secondly, as it may
affect that of other people.").
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relevant to deciding social policy. Virtue ethics has a more expansive
conception of morality and public welfare than any of these other,
later traditions. Virtue ethics expands morality to cover many kinds
of value that figure in human life, treating as relevant to both
individual and social decisionmaking whatever enhances or
diminishes the overall quality of human lives. This leads virtue
ethicists to an interest in what lends worth to human lives and,
therefore, to an interest in the full range of human interests, needs,
desires, aspirations, and activities. 8
This naturalistic humanism separates virtue ethics from
Kantianism. According to Kant, if a person acts from desire, need, or
want, that person acts heteronomously or instrumentally, in accord
with a merely hypothetical imperative; and such action does not
qualify as moral.9 In less technical terms, Kant's point was that
human needs, wants, and desires vary from person to person and even
from time to time for a single person. Thus, acts motivated by need,
desire, or want are contingent upon the existence and content of the
need, desire, or want. Kant argued that this sort of contingency has
no place in morality. 0  According to him, moral law obtains
universally and categorically.11  It extends to all rational agents,
regardless of their needs, wants, and desires; and it cannot be
identified by consulting these natural human characteristics.
Therefore, according to Kant, action directed toward satisfying
human needs, wants, and desires is not moral action.1" Indeed for
Kant morality sits in opposition to what is most natural about
humans. Since the satisfaction of human needs, wants, and desires
8. See MURDOCH, supra note 7, at 78 ("Moral philosophy is the examination of the most
important of all human activities .... The examination should be realistic. Human nature, as
opposed to the natures of other hypothetical spiritual beings, has certain discoverable attributes,
and these should be suitably considered in any discussion of morality.").
9. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 46 (James W.
Ellington trans., 3d ed. 1993). Kant describes actions as heteronymous and therefore nonmoral
if they rest on principles "drawn from. . . happiness." Id. Kant regards these as empirical or
contingent and therefore not derived from principles of pure reason, the proper basis for moral
actions:
Empirical principles are wholly unsuited to serve as the foundation for moral laws.
For the universality with which such laws ought to hold for all rational beings without
exception (the unconditioned practical necessity imposed by moral laws upon such
beings) is lost if the basis of these laws is taken from the particular constitution of
human nature or from the accidental circumstances in which such nature is placed.
Id.
10. Id. at 22-23, 34.
11. Id. at 30.
12. Id. at 13. According to Kant, such purposive action lacks moral worth because it aims
to fulfill desire rather than spring from duty arising from respect for moral law. Id. at 12-13.
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plays an important role in human flourishing, the ideal central to
virtue ethics, Kant's moral theory simply does not speak to what
matters most from the virtue ethics perspective.
Classical utilitarianism differs from Kantianism in that it makes
certain sensations experienced by human beings central to the project
of morality. This means that utilitarianism is naturalistic. But in its
singular focus on pleasure and pain, utilitarianism is not really
humanistic: it does not take seriously the idea of each individual's
potential to achieve a rich, full life, the sort of multifaceted
flourishing important in virtue ethics. In classical utilitarianism,
pleasure is the single good, and morality requires us to act so as to
increase pleasure and decrease pain. Human needs, wants, and
desires matter to utilitarians because their satisfaction or
disappointment influences the total amount of pleasure or pain in the
world. But by focusing morality solely on the production of pleasure
and the diminishment of pain, utilitarianism shifts our attention to the
overall state of the world at any given moment-to how much
pleasure or pain it contains at time T1, T2, T3 .... For the utilitarian,
morality does not require attention to discrete individuals and the
total quality of their lives. Our lives are simply vehicles for
experiencing pleasure and pain and our individual actions morally
significant only as triggers of pleasure and pain.
Virtue ethics, in contrast to both Kantianism and utilitarianism,
regards the entirety of each individual's life as the locus of value.
Ethical value does not reside in specific acts that conform to a
nonnaturalistic moral law, nor does it reside exclusively in the
production or diminishment of pleasure and pain. The good life
encompasses many things, including projects, skills, talents, activities,
relationships, and sensations. Virtue ethicists approach the question
of what makes for a good life by identifying examples of good lives,
and then examining the character traits of the individuals who have
had them.
Character traits are psychological features of people that dispose
them to regularly act in certain ways. They do this by guiding both
our perception of and our response to the world around us.
Depending upon the character traits a person has, different features
of the world stand out to her; and, therefore, the world calls for
certain responses from her.13 In other words, a person's character
13. The contemporary ethicists John McDowell and David Wiggins both discuss the
relationship between our characters, how the world strikes us, and how we respond to those
[Vol. 74:1431
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traits define her evaluative perspective on the world, making some
things matter more than others and inducing her to perform certain
actions rather than others. For example, a funny person appreciates
or sees the humor in a situation, and this moves her to crack a clever
joke about it. To take another trait, a gentle person who sees or
appreciates another person's need to be treated tenderly and quietly
offers a soothing comment or a reassuring touch.
Just as funny or gentle people do, prudent or duly careful people
see situations in a particular light and find certain actions natural or
called for in those situations. A prudent person sees opportunities for
betterment or gain and ways to realize those opportunities. A duly
careful person notices his own and others' vulnerability to injury that
he might inadvertently cause, and takes steps to reduce that
vulnerability. A person who is both prudent and duly careful is
simultaneously sensitive to opportunities for gain and to reducing the
risk of injury to others and himself.
II. PRUDENCE, CAREFULNESS, AND NEGLIGENCE
The qualities of prudence and care, both singled out in the
negligence standard, have received attention from virtue ethicists.
Both of these qualities go directly to the central concern of virtue
ethics: the characteristics that make people's lives better or worse.
Acting prudently involves making good judgments about what ends
one should have and the most appropriate and effective ways to
achieve those ends; acting carefully involves reflecting upon how
one's conduct may imperil other people's safety, a prerequisite to
their well-being. While virtue ethicists have specifically cited the
quality of prudence as a virtue, they have generally referred to
benevolence rather than care as the virtue that disposes us to care
features of the world we find striking. Both authors argue that the possession of certain traits
and attitudes leads us to appreciate features of the world that might otherwise be unavailable to
our perception, and that some of those features present themselves as inescapable reasons for
acting. See DAVID WIGGINS, A Sensible Subjectivism?, in NEEDS, VALUES, TRUTH 185, 194-
202 (3d ed. 1998).
If a property and an attitude are made for one another, it will be strange for one to use
the term for the property if he is in no way party to the attitude and there is simply no
chance of his finding that the item in question has the property. But if he is no
stranger to the attitude and the attitude is favourable [sic], it will be the most natural
thing in the world if he regards it as a matter of keen argument what it takes for a thing
to count as having the property that the attitude is paired with.
Id. at 199; see also John McDowell, Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives? Part I, in
52 THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY, SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME 13, 14 (1978) ("To a virtuous
person, certain actions are presented as practically necessary... by his view of certain situations
in which he finds himself.").
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about other people's flourishing. In this instance, I think the law
outruns virtue ethical theory by taxonomizing concern for others in a
more fine-grained way. Due care or consideration for other people's
safety is a species of benevolence, part of caring about other people
generally. Other legal spheres pertain to other species of
benevolence. Family law, for example, takes the best interests of the
child as the basic test for settling custody disputes. This test calls for
concern for the well-being of children rather than interested adults,
and, like due regard for the safety of others, this is a species of a more
general concern for others, benevolence. The law of fiduciary duties
regulates the conduct of those who handle other people's money (or
other financial assets), and this topic focuses on yet another species of
benevolence, the concern a trusted or powerful agent must show for
others' financial well-being. Precisely because the law governs a
variety of particular relationships between individuals across a range
of settings, it has developed nuanced species of benevolence, the
more general virtue historically discussed in virtue ethics.
A. Prudence: In Virtue Ethics and in the Law of Negligence
From early in the tradition, virtue ethicists have singled out as a
virtue a trait that involves good judgment in the choice and pursuit of
one's ends. Aristotle discusses phronesis, sometimes translated as
practical wisdom4 and sometimes as intelligence."5 Aristotle explains,
Now it is thought to be the mark of a man of practical wisdom to be
able to deliberate well about what is good and expedient for
himself, not in some particular respect, e.g., about what sorts of
thing conduce to health or to strength, but about what sorts of thing
conduce to the good life in general.16
Practical wisdom "is a true and reasoned state or capacity to act with
regard to the things that are good or bad for man." 7 Later virtue
ethicists refer explicitly to prudence. In the medieval period, Thomas
Aquinas discussed prudentia, which he describes as the "right reason
14. ARISTOTLE, THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1026 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941).
15. ARISTOTLE, supra note 7, at 155.
16. ARISTOTLE, supra note 14, at 1026 (lines 1140a25-30). In the Irwin translation, this
passage reads: "It seems proper, then, to an intelligent person to be able to deliberate finely
about what is good and beneficial for himself, not about some restricted area-e.g. about what
promotes health or strength-but about what promotes living well in general." ARISTOTLE,
supra note 7, at 153 (lines 1140a25-30).
17. ARISTOTLE, supra note 14, at 1026 (lines 1140b4-6). Irwin translates this passage as
follows. "[I]ntelligence is a state grasping the truth, involving reason, concerned with action
about what is good or bad for a human being." ARISTOTLE, supra note 7, at 154 (lines 1140b4-
6).
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of things to be done."' 8  Adam Smith, a virtue ethicist of the
Enlightenment period, regarded prudence as the foundational virtue
for achieving one's own well-being. 9 Smith wrote, "The care of the
health, of the fortune, or the rank and reputation of the individual,
the objects upon which his comfort and happiness in this life are
supposed principally to depend, is considered as the proper business
of that virtue which is commonly called Prudence."20 Philippa Foot, a
contemporary virtue ethicist, calls Aristotelian phronesis "wisdom"
and writes: "Wisdom, as I see it, has two parts. In the first place the
wise man knows the means to certain good ends; and secondly he
knows how much particular ends are worth."'"
While philosophical discussion of good ends and practical
wisdom or prudence and right reason might sound lofty and
highblown relative to the stuff of tort law-everyday activity that can
lead to injury-virtue ethicists themselves have regarded practical
wisdom or prudence as a trait called for in everyday life. Aristotle
considers such worldly objects as prosperity, friendship, and political
power important to flourishing.22 Since prudence enables us to
deliberate about the nature of and means to flourishing,2' it follows
that the Aristotelian conception of prudence includes deliberation
about things like prosperity and how to achieve it. Aquinas
specifically argues that the body is necessary to achieve human
happiness. 24 He goes on to argue that the body requires external
goods such as food, drink, and wealth, which serve "as instruments to
happiness. '25 Remarks such as these demonstrate that virtue ethicists
associate practical wisdom or prudence with the identification and
efficacious pursuit of ordinary goals such as wealth or prosperity,
convenience, and saving time-the sort of goals that animate our
everyday acts, acts which can create more or less risk of injury to
other people depending upon how carefully we pursue these goals.
Tort scholars of the early twentieth century undertook the task
of giving the doctrinal use of negligence an intellectually coherent
18. 2 SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA 38 (Fathers of the English
Dominican Province trans., 1952).
19. SMITH, supra note 7, at 213.
20. Id.
21. FOOT, supra note 7, at 5.
22. ARISTOTLE, supra note 7, at 21 (line 1099bl).
23. See id. at 153 (line 1140a28).
24. 1 SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA 632 (Fathers of the English
Dominican Province trans., 1952).
25. Id. at 635.
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interpretation, and their work emphasized the role identifying and
pursuing worthwhile ends plays in the concept. 26 In 1915, Professor
Henry T. Terry published a list of factors relevant to deciding
whether conduct constitutes negligence.
(1) The magnitude of the risk. A risk is more likely to be
unreasonable the greater it is.
(2) The value or importance of that which is exposed to the risk,
which is the object that the law desires to protect, and may be
called the principal object. The reasonableness of a risk means its
reasonableness with respect to the principal object.
(3) A person who takes a risk of injuring the principal object
usually does so because he has some reason of his own for such
conduct,-is pursuing some object of his own. This may be called
the collateral object. In some cases, at least, the value or
importance of the collateral object is properly to be considered in
deciding upon the reasonableness of the risk.
(4) The probability that the collateral object will be attained by the
conduct which involves risk to the principal; the utility of the risk.
(5) The probability that the collateral object would not have been
attained without taking the risk; the necessity of the risk. 27
While tort scholars have construed Terry's mention of utility and
probabilities as indications that he was groping toward a cost-benefit
model of negligence, 28 the text as a whole does not support this
interpretation. By citing the importance of the "collateral object"-
the actor's own chosen end-and the need to take a risk to achieve
that, Terry is describing factors relevant to a person of prudence,
somebody who is spotting opportunities and figuring out which
conduct would realize them effectively. Terry's list suggests that
26. The concept of tortious negligence is a relatively young one, not really solidified
doctrinally until the middle to late nineteenth century. See Roscoe Pound, Foreword, in
SELECrED ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF TORTS iii (1924). Pound explains that the first efforts by
treatise and textbook authors to cover tort law, undertaken between 1859 and 1874, tended to
be itemized surveys of specific causes of action. Not until Wigmore's Cases on Torts, published
in 1911, does a commentator provide a completely "generalized systematic treatment" of
negligence law. Pound, supra, at iii.
27. Henry T. Terry, Negligence, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note
26, at 261, 263-64.
28. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 193-95 (6th ed.
1995). Epstein includes Terry's list in a section with cases on the "Calculus of Risk." Id. at 189-
210. This section leads up to the presentation of United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d
169 (2d. Cir. 1947), the case in which Judge Learned Hand described negligence in "algebraic
terms" and claimed that the defendant's actions constituted negligence if the burden of taking
adequate precautions against an accident was less than the probability of injury without taking
those precautions. Id. at 172. Richard Posner famously claimed that in Carroll Towing "Hand
was adumbrating, perhaps unwittingly, an economic meaning of negligence." Richard A.
Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STuD. 29,32 (1972).
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acting nonnegligently involves noticing which ends are worthwhile
from a social perspective and which from a personal one, balancing
the importance of each, and taking effective means to achieve this
balance. This process differs from economic cost-benefit analysis in a
number of ways. It does not characterize the worth of ends in terms
of preference-satisfaction; it does not suggest that maximal preference
satisfaction is always the appropriate balance; and it does not
mandate that the balance always be achieved in the most
economically efficient fashion.
Another famous tort scholar of the first half of the twentieth
century, Professor Warren A. Seavey, claimed that tort law imposes
upon people "a duty not to permit [their] activities ... to create an
undue risk of harm to any protected interest of another." Seavey
explained that tort law seeks to reconcile "competing interests" when
assessing whether risk is undue:
Persons who act necessarily create risks to others, and unless
activity is to be entirely at the risk of the actor it is only where the
risk becomes excessive that liability is imposed. Since the public is
interested in having activities conducted, the law recognizes a
privilege for a person who acts in the advancement of his own
interests, the interests of a third person, or those of the public, to
create risks of harm to third persons which are not disproportionate
to the interests sought to be advanced or protected.29
Like Terry's, Seavey's understanding of undue risk contemplates a
balancing of ends, including the ends of advancing one's own and
others' interests in being free from physical harm as well as a variety
of other interests, some more personal than others. He does not
suggest that this balancing is identical to welfare or utility
maximization nor that cost-benefit analysis is the way to judge the
appropriate balance. Rather, he writes that the standard qualities
relevant to judging this balance are "such knowledge, intelligence,
and consideration for the interests of others as is possessed by the
normal person in the community."30 Seavey's emphasis on knowledge
and intelligence intimates that the virtue Aristotle called phronesis,
Aquinas called prudentia, Smith called prudence, and Foot calls
practical wisdom-the virtue of deliberating wisely about what ends
contribute to human flourishing and how to achieve them-is a trait
valorized in American negligence law.
29. Warren A. Seavey, Principles of Torts, 56 HARV. L. REv. 72, 89 (1942).
30. Id. at 88.
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B. Benevolence and Care: In Virtue Ethics and in Tort Law
Both Terry and Seavey discuss a general regard for others'
interests as well as one's own when they interpret the meaning of
negligence. In contrast, early virtue ethicists did not delineate a
virtue of caring generally about others' welfare, although Aquinas did
introduce to Aristotelian ethics the virtue of beneficence, a
disposition to give to others, particularly those connected to oneself.',
The idea of a more general disposition to care about others' well-
being, even if not to always actively promote it, enters virtue ethics
through the British moral tradition, especially in the work of David
Hume and Adam Smith. These philosophers also expressly
understood one's character traits to shape one's particular evaluative
perspective on the world, both framing how one views any given
situation and how one responds to it, especially on an emotional level.
Hume attributed to people sympathy, a psychological tendency
to share, literally, other people's feelings.32 In a Humean moral
psychology, sympathy functions as the engine of benevolence. If we
literally feel other people's feelings, we will be disposed to care about
how they feel because our own feelings vary accordingly. Thus, we
will be disposed to act to promote good feelings in others so that we
may, through the mechanism of sympathy, enjoy good feelings
ourselves. As in Hume's theory, sympathy is foundational to Adam
Smith's account of the moral. Smith begins his treatise The Theory of
Moral Sentiments by noting our tendencies toward sympathy and
benevolence: "How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are
evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the
fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him,
though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it.""3
31. Aristotle delineated other-regarding virtues (generosity, magnificence, mildness,
friendliness, truthfulness, and wit), but apparently did not recognize a disposition to care about
humankind in general. Aristotelian other-regarding virtues pertain to dispositions relevant to
the treatment of acquaintances and friends, those with whom one comes into direct contact.
Aquinas identifies a virtue of beneficence, a disposition to affirmatively bestow benefits on
others. AQUINAS, supra note 18, at 538. Although Aquinas held that beneficence sometimes
calls for "succour[ing]" a stranger, id., he thought beneficence is usually directed toward those
with whom one is connected, by ties of family, citizenship, or faith. Id. Aquinas seems to hold
that under certain circumstances beneficence disposes us to affirmatively give to or aid
strangers, but that these circumstances are rare. "[B]eneficence follows on love....
[Bleneficence also should extend to all, but according as time and place require; for all acts of
virtue must be modified with a view to their due circumstances." Id. at 537.
32. DAvID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 316 (L. A. Selby-Bigge & P. H.
Nidditch eds., 2d ed. 1978) (1888).
33. SMITH, supra note 7, at 9.
[Vol. 74:1431
PRUDENCE, BENEVOLENCE, AND NEGLIGENCE
Unlike Hume, though, Smith does not think that we care about
the happiness of others because we actually share directly their
feelings. "As we have no immediate experience of what other men
feel, we can form no idea of the manner in which they are affected,
but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like
situation. '' 34
Smithean sympathy operates because we can conceive of
ourselves in the situation of another and then appreciate how he
would feel. "Sympathy, therefore, does not arise so much from the
view of the passion, as from that of the situation which excites it.""3
Sympathy leads us to put our own interests and feelings into a
broader social perspective.
[A]s nature teaches the spectators to assume the circumstances of
the person principally concerned, so she teaches this last in some
measure to assume those of the spectators. As they are continually
placing themselves in his situation, and thence conceiving emotions
similar to what he feels; so he is constantly placing himself in theirs,
and thence conceiving some degree of that coolness about his own
fortune, with which he is sensible that they will view it. As they are
constantly considering what they themselves would feel, if they
actually were the sufferers, so he is as constantly led to imagine in
what manner he would be affected if he was only one of the
spectators of his own situation. As their sympathy makes them
look at it, in some measure, with his eyes, so his sympathy makes
him look at it, in some measure, with theirs, especially when in their
presence and acting under their observation: and as the reflected
passion, which he thus conceives, is much weaker than the original
one, it necessarily abates the violence of what he felt before he
came into their presence, before he began to recollect in what
manner they would be affected by it, and to view his situation in
this candid and impartial light.3 6
Sympathy sets the stage for benevolence by inspiring people to
conceive of other people's feelings and to efface their conceptions of
their own feelings. Benevolence tempers the prudential disposition to
promote our own flourishing exclusively rather than aid the
flourishing of others.
While Smith, like Hume, thinks that sympathy operates most
powerfully with regard to those whom we directly and regularly
encounter, he does not preclude its extension to strangers. Not only
does Smith think we sympathize with fellow members of our society
34. Id.
35. Id. at 12.
36. Id. at 22.
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whom we do not personally know, but he also believes "our good-will
is circumscribed by no boundary, but may embrace the immensity of
the universe. '37 He claims that, via our imagination, our benevolence
extends potentially universally. "We cannot form the idea of any
innocent and sensible being, whose happiness we should not desire, or
to whose misery, when distinctly brought home to the imagination, we
should not have some degree of aversion. '38 This desire for others'
happiness and aversion to their misery disposes us to act benevolently
toward strangers, to those whose emotions we do not directly
observe-so long as we "form an idea" of them.
III. JUDGMENTS OF NEGLIGENCE: THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS IN
PRUDENCE AND DUE CARE
Virtue ethicists recognize that we do not always act in accord
with the virtues available to us. But according to virtue ethics, we
naturally have the capacity to see what these traits ask of us. We can
take up the perspective of a virtuous person to see how she would
conduct herself in a particular situation. The more naturally certain
virtues come to us, the more easily we can inhabit the perspective
they define. In the previous section I discussed two traits that virtue
ethicists have thought particularly amenable to human beings:
prudence and benevolence. I noted that expositors of the civil
negligence standard seem to presuppose that actions arising from or
in accord with these traits are not negligent. In this section I discuss
how jurors can take up the evaluative perspective defined by
prudence and benevolence to ascertain the particular actions to be
expected from a person of these virtues.
In a civil negligence trial, the judge instructs the jury on the
nature of negligence, using definitions such as the following. Note
especially that these instructions make no mention of cost-benefit or
risk utility analysis39 nor any sort of Kantian measure according to
37. Id. at 235.
38. Id.
39. Stephen Gilles has explored the significance of the divergence between commentators'
commitment to a Learned Hand cost-benefit approach to negligence and the actual instructions
given to jurors in negligence cases. Stephen G. Gilles, The Invisible Hand Formula, 80 VA. L.
REv. 1015 (1994). Gilles argues that, if courts are committed to a cost-benefit approach to
evaluating negligence, they should modify jury instructions to explicitly direct the jury to
perform this sort of analysis, calling the Hand Formula "an unjustifiably underenforced norm."
Id. at 1020. I reject this conclusion since I take the persistence of jury instructions such as those
quoted in the text as evidence that the Hand Formula is not the norm that governs negligence
law.
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which nonnegligent action would be action whose underlying maxim
could be universalized to all rational beings.
Negligence is lack of ordinary care. It is a failure to use that degree
of care that a reasonably prudent person would have used under
the same circumstances. Negligence may arise from doing an act
that a reasonably prudent person would not have done under the
same circumstances, or, on the other hand, from failing to do an act
that a reasonably prudent person would have done under the same
circumstances. 40
Negligence is the doing of something which a reasonably prudent
person would not do, or the failure to do something which a
reasonably prudent person would do, under circumstances similar
to those shown by the evidence. It is the failure to use ordinary or
reasonable care. Ordinary or reasonable care is that care which
persons of ordinary prudence would use in order to avoid injury to
themselves or others under circumstances similar to those shown by
the evidence.41
Negligence is the doing of some act which a reasonably prudent
person would not do, or the failure to do something which a
reasonably prudent person would do, when prompted by
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human
affairs. It is, in other words, the failure to use ordinary care under
the circumstances in the management of one's person or property,
or of agencies under one's control. 42
These instructions typify those given throughout American jurisdic-
tions. 43 According to such instructions, to decide whether a defendant
acted negligently, jurors must compare his or her conduct to the
40. 1A COMMITIEE ON PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS ASS'N OF SUPREME COURT
JUSTICES, NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS -CIVIL NO. 2:10 (3d ed. 1999).
41. 1 CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL No. 3.10 (8th ed. 1994).
42. FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE & INSTRUCTION § 80.03 (5th ed. forthcoming 2000).
43. See, e.g., PATTERN CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTION COMM., ALASKA PATTERN CIVIL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS 3.03A (1988) ("Negligence may consist of doing something which a reasonably
prudent person would not do, or it may consist of failing to do something which a reasonably
prudent person would do."); ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS-
CIVIL, ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL NO. 301 (4th ed. 1999) ("[Negligence is]
the failure to do something which a reasonably careful person would do, or the doing of
something which a reasonably careful person would not do .... "); ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT
COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES, ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS NO.
10.01, at 10-7 (3d ed. 1993) (Negligence is failing to do what "a reasonably careful person would
do," or doing what such a person would not do.); 1 SPECIAL COMM. ON UNIFORM COURT
INSTRUCTIONS, IOWA UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 2.1 (1970) (Negligence is "the failure
to do something which a reasonably prudent person, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, under the circumstances would do; or the
doing of something which such a person, under such circumstances, would not do.");
WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS, WASHINGTON PATTERN
JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL NO. 10.01 (3d ed. 1989) (Negligence is "the doing of some act which
a reasonably careful person would not do under the same or similar circumstances or the failure
to do something which a reasonably careful person would have done under the same or similar
circumstances.").
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exemplar formulated in tort doctrine. Jurors must engage in a
thought experiment of a kind: they must ascertain the conduct of a
fictional person possessed of particular ethical traits in circumstances
like those the actual defendant faced when he or she44 acted in a way
that ultimately caused injury to another person. This thought
experiment produces something akin to a prediction of an actual
person's behavior in situations where his or her conduct has the
potential to injure other people. The completion of the thought
experiment yields, I argue below, a politically legitimate, normative
expectation that proscribes or permits that particular conduct in
similar situations.
Philosophers of mind have advanced two theories about how
people might conduct the sort of thought experiment called for by the
jury instructions given in negligence actions-that is, how people
might cognize in order to predict other people's actions. The older
theory, folk psychology, claims that people assume that other people
have contentful attitudes that cause them to act in specific ways. 45
That is, when we anticipate another person's actions, we attribute to
them certain beliefs, desires, and other attitudes that then move them
to act one way or another. When we interpret an action somebody
has already taken, we do so by assuming that particular beliefs,
desires, and attitudes moved them to act in that particular way.
Either way, we view the other person more or less independently of
our own beliefs, desires, and attitudes, arriving at predictions and
interpretations by making definite hypotheses about the content of
their beliefs, desires, and attitudes and postulating a causal role for
them.
An alternative theory, simulation theory,46 accords more closely
with Smith and Hume's understanding of how people relate to one
another, and, therefore, may accord more readily with a virtue ethics
approach to predicting and understanding how a virtuous person acts.
44. For the moment I set aside the matter of a corporate defendant, which would be
neither a he nor a she but an it.
45. See HENRY PLOTKIN, EVOLUTION IN MIND: AN INTRODUCTION TO EVOLUTIONARY
PSYCHOLOGY 200-06 (1998) (discussing our skills as "natural psychologists" and advancing an
evolutionary explanation for the emergence of such a talent in humans); STEPHEN P. STICH,
DECONSTRUCTING THE MIND 115-31 (1996) (explaining the conventional, philosophical
account of folk psychology).
46. For good discussions of simulation theory, see Alvin I. Goldman, Empathy, Mind, and
Morals, in MENTAL SIMULATION: EVALUATIONS AND APPLICATIONS 185, 185-99, (Martin
Davies & Tony Stone eds., 1995), and Robert M. Gordon, Folk Psychology as Simulation, in
FOLK PSYCHOLOGY: THE THEORY OF MIND DEBATE 60 (Martin Davies & Tony Stone eds.,
1995).
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Simulation theorists claim that people interpret and predict another
person's actions by imaginatively projecting themselves into the other
person's position, imaginatively assuming his traits and feelings.
Rather than going through a process of hypothesizing that person's
beliefs, desires, and attitudes, we assume his evaluative, emotional
outlook and then see how we would act.47 We imaginatively run our
own cognitive capacities from the perspective inhabited by the person
we aim to interpret or predict, and thereby reach a conclusion about
his or her likely conduct.
Empirically, people may combine the two methods.48 It might be
that, in order to assign beliefs, desires, and attitudes to somebody else
in a way that enables successful prediction of her actions, we might
first have to imaginatively simulate facing her situation with her traits
and feelings. Likewise, it might not be possible to perform this
imaginative feat without attributing at least some beliefs, desires, and
attitudes to the person one is attempting to simulate. Grant that
people folk-psychologize, simulate, or combine the two methods in
order to interpret and predict one another's actions. These theories
from philosophy of mind suggest how jurors might handle the
cognitive demand placed on them by instructions that ask them to
meaningfully ascertain the actions of a fictional exemplar of
reasonableness, prudence, and due care for the safety of others. The
instructions themselves inform the jurors of the relevant
characteristics of the person they must imagine. A trial gives jurors
information about the specific circumstances they should assume the
exemplar faces as well as information about the beliefs, desires, and
goals the defendant had when she was in those circumstances. Then,
via folk psychology, simulation, or both, jurors arrive at conclusions
about how a reasonably prudent, duly careful person would have
acted in those circumstances.
A jury verdict in a negligence action constitutes a communal
47. Gary Klein and his associates have researched the role of mental simulation in
predicting events other than human actions. GARY KLEIN, SOURCES OF POWER: How PEOPLE
MAKE DECISIONS 45-109 (1998). Klein argues that in crises, successful decisionmakers rely on
mental simulation to predict the different outcomes that would follow from different decisions.
Id. at 45, 51, 89. He also argues that mental simulation results in better decisions than following
rational choice strategies, at least for experienced decisionmakers. Id. at 96, 102-03.
48. Psychological research may confirm one or the other models advanced by philosophers
of the mind, or it may inspire them to devise new models. See PLOTKIN, supra note 45, at 214
(concluding that contemporary research in developmental psychology tends to confirm that we
have a "theory of mind mechanism," a domain-specific module for understanding and
predicting the actions of other human beings). Note that such a mechanism could involve the
attribution of intentional attitudes to others, simulation, or a combination of the two.
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normative expectation based on the counterfactual prediction the jury
made in applying the negligence standard. Whenever we predict one
another's behavior, we develop expectations based on those
predictions, expectations that may be met or disappointed. This gives
expectations normative force, the capacity to guide others to act in
accordance with them. The expectation of conduct embodied in a
judgment of negligence or nonnegligence clearly has legally
normative force: it informs members of the society of what sorts of
conduct will generate a legally enforceable requirement that an
injurer compensate a victim. What gives ethical normative force to
the expectation implied by a jury's judgment of negligence is that this
expectation arises from a counterfactual prediction of the conduct of
how a person with specifically ethical traits-ordinary prudence and
due carefulness-would behave.
Viewing the jury as performing a particular epistemic and
political function when it conducts a thought experiment about how a
person possessed of particular virtues would act in certain
circumstances also bolsters virtue ethics as a moral theory. Within
moral philosophy, virtue ethics has been vulnerable to the complaint
that it lacks definitive prescriptivity because virtue ethics requires an
interpreter -generally the virtuous person- to translate virtuous
dispositions into specific actions. This has led some philosophers to
argue that virtue ethics cannot supply a complete moral theory since a
moral theory must not only tell us what character traits to have but
also what actions to take. The law's treatment of the virtue-based
negligence standard, however, provides virtue ethicists with a
response to this criticism. Virtue ethics can arrive at prescriptivity
when it is operationalized. Even if there is no formulaic way to
deduce appropriate actions from definitions of the virtues, tort law's
thought-experiment procedure for inferring specific prescriptions
based on the possession of particular virtues in particular situations
shows that virtue-based evaluative inquiry can yield specific
prescriptions for or against particular acts.
IV. ACCOUNTING FOR THE ABSENCE OF VIRTUE ETHICS IN
CONTEMPORARY TORT THEORY
Perhaps tort theory of the past fifty years has overlooked virtue
theory because many tort theorists appear to think of negligence law
as fundamentally concerned with either furthering justice or
efficiency. Actually, that statement oversimplifies the current
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landscape of American tort law scholarship. Some tort scholars have
not attempted such univocal interpretations. 49 Others accept that tort
law serves a variety of purposes, but highlight one particularly. 0 Still
others claim that although it may seem that tort law concerns itself
with multiple objectives-for example, justice and efficiency -these
apparently different goals actually collapse into one.5 1 Nevertheless,
the basic claim stands: issues of justice and efficiency have dominated
tort theory of the late twentieth century, with the result that tort
theorists have not attended to the virtues of prudence and due care
for other people's safety, the virtues specified in the tort law's actual
negligence standard. 2
Tort theorists of the 1960s and 1970s picked up on then-current
developments in political philosophy and economics. To appreciate
this era of tort law scholarship, it helps to examine more closely the
state of political philosophy and economics in the late 1960s and early
1970s. The centerpiece of this study is John Rawls' landmark book, A
Theory of Justice, published in 1971.13 In this work, Rawls compiled
49. See, e.g., Robert L. Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A
Reinterpretation, 15 GA. L. REV. 925, 930-31 (1981) (rejecting either an exclusively economic or
exclusively moral interpretation of tort law's "fault" principle); Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed
Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801,
1819-24 (1997) (arguing that both economic and ethical considerations underwrite tort law's
liability standards); Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of
Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 607 (1992) ("In light of all the tensions that
are possible between ethical and economic approaches to tort law, what is distinctive about the
negligence standard is that it achieves a certain synthesis of fairness and deterrence values.").
50. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 24-26 (1970) (claiming that accident law should serve both justice and economic
efficiency, but delaying discussion of justice in favor of focusing on the reduction of the costs of
accidents); JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 198 (1992) (claiming that corrective
justice is the core purpose of tort law, although not its only purpose).
51. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1983). In chapters three and
four, Posner argues that the traditional concerns animating justice, such as autonomy and
equality, can best be vindicated by law that aims for wealth maximization. Id. at 48-115. Posner
relies on a theory of hypothetical consent to support this claim, arguing that uninjured people
would agree to law that maximizes wealth and that negligence law achieves this aim. Therefore,
Posner concludes that those who are actually injured do not suffer a loss of autonomy if they go
uncompensated under a negligence regime. Id. at 88-101, 103-06.
52. Richard Epstein's early tort scholarship provides a counterexample. There, Epstein
attempted a tort theory premised on formal ideas of Aristotelian corrective justice. Richard A.
Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973). In his later work, however,
he has been increasingly influenced by the idea of tort law as a tool for efficient welfare
maximization. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 97 (1995)
("Efforts to refine and apply strong moral intuitions often lead to inquiries with a distinct
economic cast .. "). According to Epstein, economic welfare militates in favor of strict
liability in tort. Id.
53. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). A Theory of Justice exerted influence
over legal theorists outside of tort scholarship. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 151-83 (1977); Ronald Dworkin, The Original Position, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 500
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ideas he had been exploring in publications that appeared throughout
the 1950s and 1960s. Finally, in A Theory of Justice, Rawls presented
both a decision procedure for selecting principles of distributive
justice for the basic structure of society and two substantive
principles, which he argued would emerge from applying this
procedure.14  Rawls explicitly fashioned the proposed decision
procedure to vindicate and guarantee commitments to a Kantian
conception of personhood, with its emphasis on autonomy and
rational agency. The principles Rawls claims would be chosen by his
Kantian decision procedure place principles of liberty and equality
above considerations of efficient utility or welfare maximization.
Rawls' theory of justice, therefore, rivals both utilitarian and
economic approaches to social policy.
Both in A Theory of Justice and in his subsequent writings, Rawls
has insisted that neither the Kantian decision procedure nor the two
principles of justice apply beyond the basic structure of society.
Whether common law doctrines fall within the basic structure is a
difficult question, one Rawls himself does not address." In any event,
in 1972, torts scholar George Fletcher published Fairness and Utility
in Tort Theory,5 6 a piece with a decidedly Rawlsian flavor. Fletcher
introduces "the paradigm of reciprocity,"57 which he summarizes as a
"principle of fairness": "all individuals in society have the right to
roughly the same degree of security from risk. 5 8 Fletcher then
overtly places this principle in relation to Rawls:
By analogy to John Rawls' first principle of justice, the principle
might read: we all have the right to the maximum amount of
security compatible with a like security for everyone else. This
means that we are subject to harm, without compensation, from
background risks, but that no one may suffer harm from additional
risks without recourse for damages against the risk-creator.
Compensation is a surrogate for the individual's right to the same
(1973); Frank I. Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls'
Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962 (1973).
54. These are well-known, and I will simply restate them here. The first, lexically prior
principle is the equality principle, which requires equality in the assignment of basic rights and
duties. The second is the difference principle, which allows social and economic inequalities
only if they improve the situation of the least well-off. Justice as fairness, Rawls' substantive
theory of justice, requires that the basic structure of society conform to these principles. See
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 273 (1993).
55. See Heidi Li Feldman, Rawls' Political Constructivism as a Judicial Heuristic: A
Response to Professor Allen, 51 FLA. L. REV. 67, 76-78 (1999) (analyzing when, if ever, common
law falls within the basic structure of society on a Rawlsian view of the basic structure).
56. George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972).
57. Id. at 543.
58. Id. at 550.
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security as enjoyed by others. But the violation of the right to
equal security does not mean that one should be able to enjoin the
risk-creating activity or impose criminal penalties against the risk-
creator. The interests of society may often require a dispropor-
tionate distribution of risk. Yet, according to the paradigm of
reciprocity, the interests of the individual require us to grant
compensation whenever this disproportionate distribution of risk
injures someone subject to more than his fair share of risk.59
Fletcher's label-the paradigm of reciprocity-can be a bit confusing
because Rawls himself considers his first principle of justice a
principle of reasonableness. Nonetheless, Fletcher, like Rawls, means
to contrast a principle of fairness with principles of utility or welfare
maximization. Fletcher's paradigm of reciprocity opposes the
paradigm of reasonableness, which he regards as a fundamentally
utilitarian framework.
According to Fletcher, the paradigm of reasonableness in tort
law emerged in the nineteenth century.
The new paradigm challenged the assumption that the issue of
liability could be decided on grounds of fairness to both victim and
defendant without considering the impact of the decisions on the
society at large. It further challenged the assumption that victim's
right to recovery was distinguishable from the defendant's duty to
pay.
The core of this revolutionary change was a shift in the meaning of
the word "fault." ... Recasting fault ... into an inquiry about the
reasonableness of risk-taking laid the foundation for the new
paradigm of liability. It provided the medium for tying the
determination of liability to maximization of social utility, and it led
to the conceptual connection between the issue of fault and the
victim's right to recover.6°
Fletcher concludes that the reasonable person standard is a vehicle
for utilitarian social policy.
The reasonable man became a central, almost indispensable figure
in the paradigm of reasonableness. By asking what a reasonable
man would do under the circumstances, judges could assay the
issues both of justifying and excusing risks. Reasonable men,
presumably, seek to maximize utility; therefore, to ask what a
reasonable man would do is to inquire into the justifiability of the
risk. 6
1
I reject Fletcher's conclusory connection between the reasonable
59. Id. at 550-51.
60. Id. at 556-57.
61. Id. at 560.
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person standard and utilitarianism. Grant that the reasonable person
of ordinary prudence who acts with due care for the safety of others
emerged as the negligence regime's central standard during the
nineteenth century. As I noted at the outset of this Article, the full
language of the standard does not invoke utilitarianism, and we need
not automatically substitute the neoclassical economically rational
actor for the reasonable person represented in tort law. Nothing
compels tort theory to include neoclassical economics' controversial
conception of rationality, according to which acting rationally just
amounts to efficiently maximizing preference satisfaction. 62  In a
sense, Fletcher realizes this, attempting to advance a nonutilitarian
theory of negligence law. But his effort seems blindered. Fairness
and Utility in Tort Theory reads as if a Rawlsian interpretation of
negligence law was the only conceivable alternative to a utilitarian
approach. Had Fletcher paid attention to the full doctrinal rep-
resentation of the reasonable person, which depicts her as not only
reasonable but also prudential and concerned for the safety of others,
Fletcher might have noticed that negligence law invites attention to
certain virtues and hence to virtue ethics.
Fletcher was not alone in his neglect of the full doctrinal
representation, however. He was presenting his theory to rival the
burgeoning law and economics movement in tort theory, a movement
whose central and primary expositor, Richard Posner, did cast the
reasonable person standard in neoclassical economic terms, and
hence in the utilitarian tradition. In 1972, Posner published A Theory
of Negligence,63 another landmark in tort theory. A progenitor of the
law and economics interpretation of American tort law, Posner
argued that the "dominant function of the fault system is to generate
rules of liability that if followed will bring about, at least
approximately, the efficient-the cost-justified-level of accidents
and safety."64 He summarized his theory as follows.
Under this view, damages are assessed against the defendant as a
way of measuring the costs of accidents, and the damages so
62. I have argued this point elsewhere. See Heidi Li Feldman, Harm and Money: Against
the Insurance Theory of Tort Compensation, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1567 (1997). Many philosophers
and some economists have criticized the neoclassical economic conception of rationality. See,
e.g., ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 201-02 (1993); Amartya K.
Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, in BEYOND
SELF-INTEREST 25, 42-43 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990). Legal scholars have also offered
critiques. See Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
1129 (1986).
63. Posner, supra note 28.
64. Id. at 33.
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assessed are paid over to the plaintiff (to be divided with his
lawyer) as the price of enlisting their participation in the operation
of the system. Because we do not like to see resources squandered,
a judgment of negligence has inescapable overtones of moral
disapproval, for it implies that there was a cheaper alternative to
the accident. Conversely, there is no moral indignation in the case
where in which the cost of prevention would have exceeded the
cost of the accident. Where the measures necessary to avert the
accident would have consumed excessive resources, there is no
occasion to condemn the defendant for not having taken them.
If indignation has its roots in inefficiency, we do not have to decide
whether regulation, or compensation, or retribution, or some
mixture of these best describes the dominant purpose of negligence
law. In any case, the judgment of liability depends ultimately on a
weighing of costs and benefits. 65
In this synopsis, Posner advances an economic interpretation of the
negligence regime. Then, in an effort to connect this interpretation to
the moral dimension of tort law, Posner claims that inefficient actions
provoke moral indignation.
Posner may have been following J. S. Mill's lead, suggesting that
our usual moral sentiments, which we generally do not consciously
consider to be driven by utilitarian or economic concerns, are in fact
driven by such concerns.66 Or, as Posner himself argued in later work,
he may have been associating our supposed moral indignation over
inefficiency with a quasi-Kantian concern that inefficient social policy
interferes with every citizen's autonomy. 67  Posner may even be a
latent virtue theorist, claiming that parsimony, possibly a moral
virtue, accounts for moral indignation over inefficiency. 68 Posner
himself has never satisfactorily related his theory of American
negligence law to any moral theory, so he has never delivered an
65. Id. at 33-34.
66. In chapter five of Utilitarianism, Mill addresses our feelings of justice and injustice, and
argues that, despite appearance and intuitions to the contrary, these feelings spring from the
utility of just action and the disutility of unjust ones. See JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM
42 (Samuel Gorovitz ed., 1971) (1861).
67. Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common
Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980).
68. Posner's commitment to virtue ethics may not be so latent. When defending wealth-
maximization, an ethical goal, he writes, "[Tihe wealth-maximization principle encourages and
rewards the traditional 'Calvinist' or 'Protestant' virtues and capacities associated with
economic progress." POSNER, supra note 51, at 68. Ultimately, however, Posner seems to
maintain wealth-maximization as a moral good justifiable on grounds independent of any major
philosophical tradition, including virtue ethics, Kantianism, and utilitarianism. See id. at 115 ("I
have tried to develop a moral theory that goes beyond classical utilitarianism and holds that the
criterion for judging whether acts and institutions are just or good is whether they maximize the
wealth of society. This approach allows a reconciliation among utility, liberty, and even equality
as competing ethical principles.").
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adequate philosophical- or psychological -diagnosis for why we
should experience moral indignation when faced with inefficient
accidents. Whatever the connection between moral theory and
Posner's economic interpretation of the negligence regime, Posner,
like Fletcher, never discusses the virtues of prudence and regard for
others' safety, traits specifically itemized in negligence law's
distinctive standard of care. Posner characterizes his ambition as
follows: to "formulate and test ... a theory to explain the social
function of the negligence concept and of the fault system of accident
liability that is built upon it."'69 Along the way, though, Posner
overlooks the exact doctrine at the heart of American negligence law.
Other scholars who associated tort law with economics moved
even further away from the reasonable person standard. In 1970,
Guido Calabresi published a path-breaking book, The Cost of
Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis.70 Calabresi asserted that
"the principle goals of any system of accident law [are that] it must be
just or fair [and] it must reduce the costs of accidents. ' 71 Unlike
Posner, Calabresi did not equate or reduce the justness or fairness of
tort law to economic efficiency: "An economically optimal system of
reducing accident costs.., might be totally or partially unacceptable
because it strikes us as unfair, and no amount of discussion of the
efficiency of the system would do much to save it. Justice must
ultimately have its due. ' '72 But unlike Fletcher, Calabresi chose to set
aside questions of distributive justice in pursuit of a prescription for
an economically efficient accident law:
But if the elusiveness of justice cannot justify ignoring the concept,
it at least justifies delaying discussion of it.... Apart from the
requirements of justice, I take it as axiomatic that the principal
function of accident law is to reduce the sum of the costs of
accidents and the costs of avoiding accidents. 73
In somewhat simplified terms, here is Calabresi's view of how to
achieve this goal: tort law should assign liability for the cost of an
accident to the party who was in the best position to prevent the
accident at the least expense, regardless of how carefully or carelessly
that party acted at the time of the accident. Now, the reasonable
person standard is a measure of care, so it plays no role in Calabresi's
69. Posner, supra note 28, at 29.
70. CALABRESI, supra note 50.
71. Id. at 24.
72. Id. at 25-26.
73. Id. at 26.
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theory of accident law. So Calabresi cannot be properly criticized for
neglecting to attend to the virtues assigned to the reasonable person
in the American negligence regime. But his theory does support my
claim that the tort theorists of the 1970s were concerned primarily
with distributive justice or economic efficiency, with Calabresi
representing the latter concern. In Rawlsian spirit-and like
Fletcher- Calabresi conceived of tort law as furthering either
economic efficiency or distributive justice. Framing the choice this
way invites one to ignore the virtues highlighted in the reasonable
person standard.
By the 1980s, some tort theorists-Jules Coleman and Ernest
Weinrib in particular-noticed that the previous decade's focus on
the distributive justice and economic efficiency of American tort law
overlooked one quite distinctive feature of the system: traditional
American tort litigation revolves around a particular victim seeking
compensation from a particular injurer, a paradigmatic scenario of
corrective justice. Scholars such as Coleman and Weinrib stressed the
place of corrective justice in tort law and theory.
Weinrib quite explicitly combines "a Kantian content" with an
"Aristotelian corrective justice structure" to develop "[a] moral
conception of negligence in tort law. '74 Weinrib's emphasis on a
Kantian content aligns him with the previous decade's primary
expositor of a moral conception of negligence, George Fletcher,
although Weinrib's theory differs from Fletcher's in a number of
respects. Fletcher maintained that the reasonable person standard is
primarily utilitarian, promoting wealth maximization at the expense
of individual autonomy. Weinrib claims that the reasonableness
element in the tort standard should be read as a reference to a
Kantian conception of reason, according to which reason itself
requires that we treat each other as equals in a kingdom of ends. In
this setting, one who injures another disturbs the parity between
equals who regard one another as ends in themselves, and this
disturbance gives rise to an obligation on the part of the injurer to
restore parity by compensating the injured.
Jules Coleman's views on corrective justice and its place in tort
law defy easy characterization. Admirably, Coleman has continued
to develop and refine his position since he first presented his own
affirmative account of American tort law in the 1980s. Through
74. Ernest J. Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 LAW & PHIL. 37, 37
(1983).
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debate and exchange with fellow thinkers such as Posner, Fletcher,
and Weinrib, Coleman has continuously sought to improve his own
ideas. In this Article, I take the liberty of freezing Coleman's
thoughts, based on his presentation of them in The Mixed Conception
of Corrective Justice, a chapter in his 1992 book, Risks and Wrongs.7 5
Although Coleman differs from Weinrib in that he believes that
accident law implements both economic and moral principles and
policies, Coleman shares with Weinrib the belief that the structure of
tort law embodies corrective justice, a noninstrumental dimension of
American tort law. According to Coleman, "Corrective justice
imposes on wrongdoers the duty to repair the wrongful losses their
conduct occasions, losses for which they are responsible.7 6  He
explains:
Corrective justice has two dimensions. First, losses are the concern
of corrective justice if they are wrongful. They are wrongful if they
result from wrongs or wrongdoings. The wrong grounds the claim
that the losses are wrongful (and thus within the ambit of corrective
justice.) Secondly, the duty to repair those wrongful losses is
grounded not in the fact that they are the result of wrongdoing, but
in the fact that the losses are the injurer's responsibility, the result
of his agency. 77
As we can see from this passage-and as Coleman himself
acknowledges -this theory of corrective justice cannot be complete
unless augmented by an account of wrongfulness. In other words,
Coleman must explain what makes a loss wrongful. In Risks and
Wrongs, he pursued this task in the chapter immediately following
The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice, in a fascinating chapter
titled Wrongfulness.78
For Coleman, corrective justice poses a problem: if corrective
justice is neither a vehicle of distributive justice nor of economic
efficiency, it must be grounded in a distinctive conception of
wrongfulness, one that differs from the wrongfulness suggested by
theories of distributive justice (inequity in distribution) or utilitarian
economic theories (inefficiency in utility production). 79 To count as a
distinct and legitimate form of justice, corrective justice must
influence our substantive theory of wrongfulness; and, furthermore,
this influence must differ from that exerted by distributive justice or
75. COLEMAN, supra note 50, at 303-28.
76. Id. at 325.
77. Id. at 326.
78. Id. at 329-60.
79. Id. at 350.
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utilitarianism.
Whereas distributive justice and social efficiency are global aims
according to Coleman, corrective justice is justice between private
parties, based on local norms.
[These local norms are] informal conventions [that] typically arise
within communities of individuals as ways of giving local expression
and content to the prohibition against unreasonable risk taking.
These conventions govern the behavior of local communities;
members of the communities develop expectations about the
behavior of others and internalize constraints regarding their own
behavior. These conventions are local, not global. It is failure to
comply with them that typically grounds duties in corrective
justice.80
The core idea in the rule of negligence is that of a convention giving
expression to a common understanding of reasonable behavior.81
With this statement, Coleman aligns himself with his fellow tort
theorists of the 1970s and 1980s. Like them, he focuses on the
reasonableness element of the reasonable person standard: to the
extent his account of negligence law incorporates a theory of
corrective justice, this theory does not examine the place of the
virtues of prudence and due care for the safety of others, character
traits tort doctrine assigns to the reasonable person whose conduct
sets the standard of care required of all members of the community.
Since corrective justice is a concept that originates with Aristotle,
whom I have already noted as the central forefather of the virtue
ethics tradition, some might conclude that torts scholars who have
focused on corrective justice have indeed focused on virtue ethics.
Yet Aristotle himself did not seriously connect his theory of
corrective justice with his theory of virtue ethics. This perhaps
accounts for the fact that modern-day advocates of a place for
corrective justice in tort law and theory have not pursued virtue
ethics.
In Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle develops a quite complicated
relationship between justice and the virtues. The complexity of this
relationship is exacerbated by the complexity of Aristotle's
conceptions of both justice and virtue. I am not a specialist in
Aristotelian philosophy, nor would it be consistent with this Article's
objectives to attempt a full exegesis of Aristotle's account of these
80. Id. at 358.
81. Id. at 359 (emphasis added).
20001
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
matters. Instead, I will provide a more schematic explication in order
to clarify my claim that attention to corrective justice does not
necessarily coincide with attention to particular virtues or to the
virtue ethics tradition.
Aristotle discusses justice in Book V of Nichomachean Ethics,82
after his discussion of flourishing as the highest good for human
beings (the subject of Book I) and his discussion of virtues of
character (in Books II, III, and IV). When Aristotle turns to the topic
of justice, he first distinguishes justice as lawfulness from justice as
fairness.83 He then immediately turns to fairness and claims that an
unjust person is greedy, for he will always choose more goods to
fewer without regard to equality in distribution. 84 Aristotle proceeds
to outline justice as lawfulness, however, he quickly sets aside this
sense of justice to return to a discussion of justice as fairness. It is in
the course of this extended discussion of justice as fairness that
Aristotle distinguishes distributive justice from rectificatory
(corrective) justice.
One species [of justice] is found in the distribution of honours or
wealth or anything else that can be divided among members of a
community who share in a political system; for here it is possible for
one member to have a share equal or unequal to another's.
Another species concerns rectification in transactions. This species
has two parts, since one sort of transaction is voluntary, and one
involuntary. Voluntary transactions include selling, buying,
lending, pledging, renting, depositing, hiring out-these are called
voluntary because the origin of these transactions is voluntary.
Some involuntary ones are secret, e.g. theft, adultery, poisoning,
pimping, slave-deception, murder by treachery, false witness; others
are forcible, e.g. assault, imprisonment, murder, plunder,
mutilation, slander, insult.85
After these passages, Aristotle elaborates on his views concerning
distributive justice, and then turns to an explication of rectificatory
justice.
The most central difference, according to Aristotle, between
distributive justice and rectificatory justice is that the just distribution
of common assets should accord with each individual's proportion of
virtue, whereas rectificatory justice does not depend upon total
character assessment.
82. ARISTOTLE, supra note 7, at 116-47 (lines 1129a-1138b10).
83. Id. at 117 (line 1129b).
84. Id. at 118 (line 1129b10).
85. Id. at 122 (lines 1131al-1131a10).
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For here [in rectificatory justice] it does not matter if a decent
person has taken from a base person, or a base person from a
decent person, or if a decent or a base person has committed
adultery. Rather, the law looks only at differences in the harm
[inflicted], and treats the people involved as equals, when one does
injustice while the other suffers it, and one has done the harm while
the other has suffered it. Hence the judge tries to restore this
unjust situation to equality, since it is unequal.86
This passage simultaneously sets the tone for the remainder of
Aristotle's account of rectificatory justice and connects this account
to his overall view of justice as a type of equality. He notes that
rectificatory justice redresses not only theft but also other types of
unfair taking, such as "when one is wounded and the other wounds
him, or one kills and the other is killed. 87 In these situations "the
action and the suffering are unequally divided [with profit for the
offender and loss for the victim]; and the judge tries to restore the
[profit and] loss to a position of equality, by subtraction from [the
offender's] profit. 88  Aristotle himself notes that "profit" is not
always "the proper word" to describe the wrongdoer's gain in
situations calling for rectificatory justice, but he explains that he is
using the term in a somewhat expansive sense: "At any rate, when
what was suffered has been measured, one part is called the [victim's]
loss, and the other the [offender's] profit." 89 The judge charged with
accomplishing rectificatory justice must ensure that both the victim
and the offender-or injurer, to use modern parlance-have the same
amount of loss and gain, in relation to one another, that each had
prior to the incident that created the rectificatory injustice.
Rectificatory justice requires a return to the mean between the victim
and the offender - a restoration in equality between the two. This
equality is to be measured according to the bilateral status quo ante
between victim and injurer, regardless of their specific character
traits. Modern tort theorists who have concentrated on corrective
justice have followed Aristotle's lead here. Ernest Weinrib and Jules
Coleman have each assigned corrective justice a prominent role in
tort theory. But, like Aristotle himself, neither have incorporated
attention to the virtues into their accounts of the role of corrective
justice in tort law.
86. Id. at 125 (lines 1132a3-1132a8).
87. Id. at 125-26 (lines 1132a8-1132a9).
88. Id. at 126 (lines 1132a9-1132all).
89. Id.
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CONCLUSION: JUDGES, JURIES, AND NEGLIGENCE
Ever since the substantive law of negligence emerged from the
old common law forms of action, particularly trespass and trespass on
the case, commentators have tried to make sense of the respective
role of the judge and the jury in deciding negligence.9° The current
usual assignment of duties at trial, according to which the judge
decides questions of law and the jury decides questions of fact, 91 does
not fit neatly with the inquiry involved in assessing negligence.
Usually, when we think of the jury as factfinder, we think of the jury
deciding plain old facts-nonnormative empirical questions, such as
whether the light was red or green when the defendant drove through
the intersection, or whether or not a technological innovation was
available to a product manufacturer when she created her product's
design. The inquiry into negligence seems more pervasively
evaluative because it requires the jury to apply a standard to facts, to
use the standard to evaluate conduct as negligent or nonnegligent,
and thereby decide whether the conduct is lawful or unlawful. On a
model of division of labor in the legal system that reserves normative
questions to the lawgiver-judge or legislature-assigning the
question of defendant's negligence to the jury can seem anomalous at
best and an evasion of official responsibility at worst.92
The virtue-ethical interpretation of the negligence standard
conceives of jurors as executing a thought experiment and thereby
seeing-or even discovering-how a certain sort of person would
behave in a certain situation. The jury's performance of the relevant
thought experiment yields a hypothetical but testable result. If we
90. See, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed.,
1963) (1881); LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 395-417 (1930); Fleming James, Jr., Functions of
Judge and Jury in Negligence Cases, 58 YALE L.J. 667 (1949); Mark P. Gergen, The Jury's Role
in Deciding Normative Issues in the American Common Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 407, 424-39
(1999).
91. See Martin A. Kotler, Reappraising the Jury's Role as Finder of Fact, 20 GA. L. REV.
123, 126 (1985) ("Following the American Revolution, the view of the jury as finder of law gave
way to the more contemporary view of the jury as finder of fact with the lawmaking function
vested in the legislature, and, to a lesser extent, the judiciary.").
92. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., predicted that gradually judges would supplant juries as
the decisionmaker on the issue of breach of the negligence standard, a development he
wholeheartedly endorsed:
But supposing a state of facts often repeated in practice, is it to be imagined that the
court is to go on leaving the standard to the jury forever? ... Either the court will find
that the fair teaching of experience is that the conduct complained of usually is or is
not blameworthy, and therefore, unless explained is or is not a ground of liability; or it
will find the jury oscillating to and fro, and will see the necessity of making up its mind
for itself.
HOLMES, supra note 90, at 98.
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had available an actual person whose sole traits were reasonableness,
prudence, and carefulness, we could, in principle, recreate the
circumstances that the defendant faced to find out how this person
acts in them. So, the jury's verdict has an empirical dimension, which
may alleviate some of the concern that courts and legislatures
abdicate their law-giving role by allowing juries to decide the question
of negligence.
But the thought experiment performed by the jury essentially
involves taking up an evaluative perspective. To the extent that
taking up such a perspective involves interpreting the traits that
define it-in this case reasonableness, prudence, and carefulness-the
thought experiment in a negligence action differs from a more strictly
scientific experiment, whether actually performed or performed only
in thought.93 Thus, there remains the issue of the appropriateness of
the jury's normative power in a negligence action. An older
generation of scholars regarded this assignment of power as an
abdication of the lawmaking function of the courts,94 itself a threat to
93. Scientists do use thought experiments as well as actual ones. One of the most famous
ones is Galileo's imagined ball and plane apparatus, which he used to prove inertia. Galileo has
us begin by picturing a ball rolling up and down in a U-shaped track resting on a level plane in a
frictionless world. The Galilean experiment then asks us to mentally manipulate the apparatus.
We fold down one side of the U, notch by notch, until it lies flat along the plane, extending into
infinity. As we lower the track, we roll the ball from the high side to the low, until the final roll
when one side of the track runs along the plane. Finally, we imaginatively observe the state of
the device to see if it teaches us anything. We see that a ball rolled in the U will obey the law of
equal heights, always reaching the same height from which it started before reversing course. In
our final drop, a ball started from the high side of the former U will run along the side of the
track that now is level. Since it will never reach the height from which it was initially dropped, it
will continue rolling infinitely. The thought experiment has demonstrated the phenomenon of
inertia. See RoY A. SORENSEN, THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS 8-9 (1992) (describing Galileo's
experiment in detail). Galileo's experiment shows how scientific thought experiments start
from a defined situation, have the experimenter mentally manipulate a particular variable, and
imaginatively observe what happens to the other parts in the set-up. Both the designer of the
thought experiment and others who perform it intend cognitive results. They mean to construct
a scenario that others can use to gain information about a specific problem that the designer of
the experiment also has in mind. I have been arguing that the reasonable person standard as
presented to the jury asks them to solve a particular problem using their abilities to reason
about how a certain kind of person would behave in a hypothetical situation, just as Galileo's
argument asks us to solve a particular problem by reasoning about how a ball on a track would
behave in a hypothetical situation.
94. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., argued:
[T]he featureless generality, that the defendant was bound to use such care as a
prudent man would do under the circumstances, ought to be continually giving place to
the specific one, that he was bound to use this or that precaution under these or those
circumstances .... [Ilt is obvious that it ought to be possible, sooner or later, to
formulate these standards at least to some extent, and that to do so must at last be the
business of the court.
HOLMES, supra note 90, at 89.
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the rule of law. 95
If we accept the basic principle of democratic self-governance,
however, this worry seems rather peculiar. Ordinarily, the idea that
responses to nonconstitutional normative questions are political and
subject to revision through political processes in which citizens
participate raises few eyebrows. If the people have ultimate authority
over the law, and law is fundamentally normative, then a process in
which ordinary citizens have normative authority seems both
commonsensical and easily justifiable. Indeed, in other legal settings,
scholars have wrestled to justify judicial lawmaking in light of
concerns that it is fundamentally antidemocratic. 96
In the contemporary academy, many who deride the reasonable
person standard criticize it for its supposed indeterminacy, its failure
to provide a sufficiently formulaic guide to conduct. These critics
tend to prefer an economic interpretation of negligence on the
assumption that cost-benefit analyses or social welfare functions are
more determinate than the reasonable person standard and therefore
can guide conduct more specifically and concretely. Those who make
this sort of argument tend to use it to justify dispensing with the jury
as the legal decisionmaker on the issue of negligence. 97 In this
95. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule
of Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467, 468-82 (1976). Although Henderson's primary target is not the
reasonable person standard, he thinks that this approach to tort law is problematically
"polycentric" or open-ended, a difficulty that is hidden by having juries apply the standard.
96. In constitutional law scholarship, resolving the "countermajoritarian" problem-the
tension between judicial review and democracy-has been called "the central obsession of
modem constitutional scholarship." Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 334 (1998).
Alexander M. Bickel seems to have introduced the term "countermajoritarian" and articulated
an influential encapsulation of the problem in the context of American law and government.
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 16-23 (1962).
The root difficulty is that judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force in our
system ... [that] thwarts the will of representatives of the actual people of the here and
now; it exercises control, not in behalf of the prevailing majority, but against it. That,
without mystic overtones, is what actually happens. It is an altogether different kettle
of fish, and it is the reason the charge can be made that judicial review is undemocratic.
Id. at 16-17.
97. See Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can't Do Well: The Jury's Performance
as a Risk Manager, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 901 (1998).
Thus we ask: Can the jury perform in a manner so that it serves as an effective societal
risk manager? To avoid any pretense of suspense, we believe that this is an extremely
difficult function that is often not performed effectively even by the best informed
experts. The jury is ill-informed and poorly equipped to perform this function. In our
view, effective risk identification and management often requires the application of
technical, statistical, and scientific analytic tools that cannot be effectively
communicated to the unschooled layperson through expert testimony in adversarial
procedures. Furthermore, although an effective risk management policy is founded on
the detailed analysis of individual cases (for example, accidents and non-accidents), it
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Article, I have attempted to show that, if we emphasize the virtues
specified in the negligence standard, we can see that, through
repeated applications, jury verdicts provide actors with guideposts to
the sort of conduct to be expected from reasonable persons who
possess the traits of prudence and due carefulness for the safety of
others. One way somebody might anticipate whether her actions
conform to this standard is for her to cultivate the relevant traits.
Another would be for an actor to at least learn how to take up the
evaluative perspective defined by them. In other words, actors who
seek to conform to the standard may attempt to do so by cultivating
the virtues of prudence and carefulness or by exercising their own
capacity to perform ex ante the sort of thought experiment a jury
judging their conduct would perform ex post.
Interestingly, the entities perhaps least well-positioned to use
these methods to conform their conduct to the negligence standard
are corporate persons, who, some might argue, lack the sort of
personhood necessary to cultivate character traits or learn to adopt an
evaluative perspective informed by certain sentimental responses.
For the sake of my final argument in this Article, I will make two
assumptions, each of which merit further investigation: first, that
corporations as currently structured can readily perform accurate
cost-benefit analyses that take into account social costs and benefits
as well as private ones; second, that corporations would have to
institute different internal procedures and arrangements to conform
their conduct to that called for by the evaluative perspective
delineated by the negligence standard. Neither individually nor taken
together do these premises command a shift from a negligence
standard based on the evaluative perspective of natural persons to
one based on the evaluative perspective of a corporate one. The law
grants corporate persons their existence; the law also governs their
actions. If democratic principles warrant the jury's authority to
decide what behavior accords with the requirements of prudence and
care, then the jury has the authority to demand that corporate
persons conform their conduct to that of a reasonable, prudent,
careful natural person. This may mean that in effect juries require
corporate persons to set aside the objective of welfare maximization
requires an omnibus consideration of the distribution of cases, probabilities, benefits,
and costs. In contrast, the tort jury trial focuses on a single case, sampled from only
one of the four cells of a hypothetical risk analysis matrix: the too-few-precautions,
harmful outcome cell.
Id. at 902.
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in the name of other values-as the Ford Pinto or McDonald's hot
coffee juries arguably concluded those corporate defendants should
have done. Unless one is precommitted to the view that the only
legitimate way to define an appropriate balance between freedom
and safety is to strike the balance that maximizes preference
satisfaction or social utility, this possibility should seem entirely
unthreatening. The law and the citizens who apply it may rightly
expect corporate persons to adopt whatever internal procedures are
necessary to ensure that their conduct matches the conduct we expect
from the reasonable person of ordinary prudence who acts with due
regard for the safety of others.
